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19. THE MEASUREMENT OF INCOME MOBILITY: 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LITERATURE 
Gary S. Fields and Efe A. Ok1 
1. Introduction 
Evaluation of distributions of income on the basis of equality is one of the most extensively 
studied topics in the general field of welfare economics. There is thus an enormous body 
of work devoted exclusively to the problem of the measurement of welfare and income 
inequality experienced by a given society.2 However, the majority of these studies are 
conducted in static terms, where the so-called "snapshots" of the income distributions are 
taken as the primitives of the analysis. Nevertheless, static evaluations of income 
distributions can provide only an incomplete picture, for, in most instances, the social 
welfare would certainly depend on the dynamics of income distribution as well.3 This basic 
insight, along with the increased availability of longitudinal data sets, has led to a massive 
and rapidly expanding literature on the measurement of income mobility. This chapter 
surveys the highlights of this literature. 
In contrast to income inequality, "income mobility" concerns the changes in economic 
status from one time period or generation to another.4 Consequently, mobility studies take 
time paths of income distributions as the primitives of the analysis, and in this sense, are of 
multivariate nature. These studies usually take place either in intragenerational contexts by 
means of longitudinal or retrospective data for the same individual, or in intergenerational 
contexts where the focus is rather on the relationship between the incomes of the parents and 
of their offspring. 
There is, indeed, a substantial literature on how to measure income mobility. But unlike 
the theories of measurement of income inequality and economic poverty, the mobility 
literature does not provide a unified discourse of analysis. This might be because the very 
notion of income mobility is not well-defined; different studies concentrate on different 
aspects of this multi-faceted concept. At any rate, it seems safe to say that a considerable 
degree of confusion confronts a newcomer to the field. 
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Our main purpose in this survey is, therefore, to provide a somewhat unified setting 
within which the basic features of the theory of income mobility measurement can be 
outlined. Our aim is to provide a (subjectively) selective introduction to the literature on 
income mobility, and thereby shed some light on particular aspects of mobility measurement. 
Consequently, the present study should not be viewed as an exhaustive survey of the related 
literature. It is rather a very concise account of some key elements of the theory of income 
mobility measurement.5 
The organization of this chapter is as follows. In section 2, we introduce a simple 
framework for analysis which allows us to examine a number of fundamental issues 
concerning our perceptions of "income mobility". In this introductory section, we try to 
illustrate the distinctions between some key aspects of the mobility concept including the 
notions of temporal independence and aggregate income movements. Particular attention is 
given to the examination of some elementary concepts like transition matrices, relative vs. 
absolute mobility, and exchange vs. structural mobility. 
There are only few axiomatic studies on the measurement of income mobility; a situation 
which stands in stark contrast with the sister measurement theory of income inequality. 
Section 3 shows that axiomatics may, in fact, turn out to be very fruitful in mobility 
measurement. In this section, we characterize a number of measures of income movement 
which may prove useful in future empirical work. One of these indices is even additively 
decomposable into two parts, and this yields a practical disaggregation of total mobility into 
growth and transfer components. Finally, a descriptive income mobility ordering, which is 
reminiscent of the celebrated Lorenz ordering in some respects, is also introduced in section 
3. 
Section 4 outlines a number of welfarist approaches developed in the context of income 
mobility measurement in recent years, and studies the mobility indices of King and 
Chakravarty, Dutta and Weymark. These measures not only exhibit the general features of 
a welfarist mobility index, but also broaden one's ethical perspective by addressing two 
distinct normative facets of income mobility. Finally, in section 4, we present a brief 
discussion of Atkinson's well-known normative mobility ordering, and a new index of 
relative income mobility. 
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In section 5, we turn to a different setting which is suitable for introducing perhaps the 
most popular approach in income mobility measurement, namely, the Markovian approach. 
This framework proves particularly useful in clarifying the difference between the 
fundamental mobility notions of temporal independence and aggregate income movements. 
Next, we illustrate how the performance of the Markovian approach is improved by the 
recent introduction of monotone mobility matrices. In particular, we present a simple 
example which demonstrates explicitly that monotone Markov chains have a lot to say on the 
issue of intertemporal inequality dominance. Finally, we introduce Dardanoni's (social) 
mobility ordering, briefly discuss some of its properties, and close section 5 with a caveat 
outlining some conventional criticisms of the basic assumptions of the Markovian mobility 
model. Our survey concludes with a few final remarks. 
2. Basic Concepts of Mobility Measurement 
2.1 A framework for analysis 
The basic primitive of any study on income mobility is the time path of the income 
distribution among the same individuals or among the dynasties in a given society. In its 
simplest form, therefore, such a study requires at least two observations on income. To 
make things precise, let us adopt the convention of taking J?" as the space of all income 
distributions with population n s: 1. Consequently, x ={xv.... ,xn)eR? represents the income 
distribution of an n-person society where agent i 's income level is xt. Now assume that the 
ith agent's income has changed to yi in a given time interval. We say that x has been 
transformed to y = <yv... ,yn) e R ", and denote this so-called distributional transformation by 
x-y. Distilled to its simplest form, the theory of income mobility measurement can be 
defined as the study of these transformations. 
While it admittedly confines the analysis to only 2-period paths of income distributions, 
this framework allows one to study both intra and intergenerational mobility measurement, 
depending on the length of the time period between the observation periods. In view of the 
fact that some studies on mobility measurement take the number of observation periods into 
consideration in a crucial manner, the present formulation is thus admittedly not without loss 
of generality.6 As we shall see, however, it allows one to introduce most of the key concepts 
of mobility measurement theory, and is thus useful with respect to our expositional purposes. 
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In passing, we note that a large number of studies on income mobility are, in fact, 
conducted directly in terms of the stochastic processes assumed to generate the observed path 
of income distributions. Our simple framework is, of course, not suitable to analyze what 
can and cannot be achieved in such probabilistic settings. We shall, therefore, consider a 
conventional stochastic framework as well later in the survey. 
2.2 Income mobility measures 
Given the framework described above, we define a mobility measure (index) as any 
continuous function / : /??"-/? with the interpretation that "x-y exhibits more mobility (as 
measured by / ) than z-vv whenever f(x,y) s /(z,w)". (For simplicity, we do not adopt a 
notation in this section which would make the dependence of / on n explicit.) It is not 
readily clear how to improve upon this disturbingly general definition before clarifying what 
one really means by "income mobility". But clarifying the meaning of mobility turns out to 
be quite non-trivial. Indeed, we shall observe throughout this survey that the very notion of 
income mobility is rather a multi-faceted one, and any attempt to devise a measure that aims 
to incorporate all aspects of income mobility is therefore destined for failure. 
To present a brief illustration of the intrinsic multi-dimensionality of the notion of 
income mobility, let us consider the following transformations: 
I: x> (1,3)-(1,3) 
II: x - (1 ,3 ) - (3 ,1 ) »y 
III: x - ( l , 3 ) - 0 , 2 ) - z 
The question is: which of these distributional transformations depicts more mobility than 
the others? 
In answering this question, many mobility analysts might choose to base their decisions 
on the correlation between the initial income distribution and the final one. Some might even 
use a simple mobility index like fr(x,y) = 1 -r(x,y) where r(x,y) stands for the correlation 
coefficient between x and y (cf. Department of Employment, 1973).7 The measure fr, and 
in fact all correlation-based indices (footnote 7) would say that process I is certainly the least 
mobile of all: / (x,x) = Q. We may easily think of at least two reasons for why this 
conclusion might be regarded as "obvious". First, no one's income has changed in process 
I, so nobody has moved away from the status quo. Second, the transformation seems very 
rigid in the sense that the final period income of a person is completely determined by his 
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or her initial income level (or that of the parent(s)). In other words, there appears to be a 
perfect (positive) dependence of one's final income state on her initial state. 
Unfortunately, these intuitions do not always agree. For instance, in comparing the 
processes II and III, one may argue that II is more mobile than III because in the former 
transformation we observe larger personal income changes than the latter; people simply 
move less in process III than in II. Indeed, fr confirms this intuition: 
fr(.x>y) s 2 > 1 =fr (x,z). There is a sense however in which III is more mobile than II since 
there appears to be no dependence of one's final income state on the initial state in process 
III, while we observe a perfect (negative) dependence in the case of process II. Therefore, 
fr fails to capture this origin independence aspect of the notion of income mobility, while it 
fares quite well with the movement aspect of mobility (see subsection 5.1 for more on this). 
For the purposes of measuring origin independence, one might prefer rather a mobility 
measure like / | r | (x,y) = 1 - \r (x,y) | .8 
There are several reasons why a welfare economist would be interested in these facets 
of income mobility. In an intergenerational context, origin independence seems to capture 
our intuitions about "equality of opportunity" which can be roughly defined as the extent to 
which personal characteristics (like talent) rather than parental background determine 
monetary rewards (cf. Loury, 1981, Benabou, 1996 and Benabou and Ok, 1999). Viewed 
this way, income mobility is a desirable notion that helps attenuate the unequal distribution 
of initial endowments. Yet, in an intragenerational context, the movement aspect of mobility 
appears to be related to the notion of "lifetime income inequality". Indeed, process II is 
intertemporally more equal than process En in the sense of lifetime equality.9 What is more, 
the movement aspect of mobility relates directly to the income flux that takes place in the 
society. Thus, by using measures of income movement, one can examine how unstable the 
incomes of the individuals have been throughout a given time period, and address questions 
related to economic insecurity and persistence of poverty (Fields and Ok, 1999).10 
This discussion demonstrates that a crucial preliminary step of any sort of mobility 
analysis is the clarification of the particular facet of the notion of "income mobility" that one 
is seeking. But even after one is clear about the particular aspect of mobility that (s)he is 
interested in, it is, of course, not readily clear which mobility measures are the "right" ones 
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for the job; a problem only too familiar from the measurement theories of income inequality 
and economic poverty. 
By far the most common way of specifying a mobility measure is to choose one that, on 
the face of it, has some intuitively appealing properties. Of course, the result is a 
multiplicity of measures, and a highly non-unified (and vastly sparse) theory of income 
mobility measurement." In this respect, the mobility measurement theory has not yet 
reached comparability with the theory of inequality measurement, where the axiomatic 
approach is now dominant.12 It is indeed regrettable that axiomatics have not been used more 
often than they have in the literature on "income mobility". 
There are, however, a small number of promising axiomatic approaches to mobility 
measurement, and in fact, we shall outline one such approach in the following section. 
Before doing this, however, we should first turn our attention to some other fundamental 
issues concerning the notion of "income mobility". 
2.3 Relative vs. absolute mobility 
Is mobility a relative or an absolute concept? The following examples may help sharpen 
one's perceptions on this matter: 
I: (1,3) - (1,3) 
IV: (1,3)-(2,6) 
V: (2,6)-(4,12) 
How do the income mobilities embodied in these distributional transformations compare? 
One who feels that at least some income mobility has taken place in process IV but not 
in process I would not, in effect, be viewing (at least a particular aspect of) income mobility 
as a strongly relative concept. By definition, a strongly relative (i.e., intertemporally scale 
invariant) mobility index/ must satisfy f(Xx, ay) =f(x,y) for all X, a >0 and all x,yeR" 
(Shorrocks, 1993). Since the initial income shares are maintained during the transformations 
I, IV and V, a strongly relative mobility measure would report that the level of mobility is 
precisely the same in all of these processes, namely, nil. Consequently, any analyst who 
holds that "process IV is more mobile (in the sense "...") than process I" implicitly rejects 
intertemporal scale invariance, and is therefore not a strong relativist in that sense. In 
particular, if one wishes to view income growth as an integral part of the mobility concept 
that (s)he is interested in, then (s)he would not choose a strongly relative mobility measure. 
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The concept of relativism is also used in a weaker sense in the literature. We say that 
a mobility measure / is (weakly) relative if f(Xx, Xy) =f(x,y) for all X>0 and all 
x,yeR?. A relative measure may or may not report positive mobility in the case of 
transformations IV and V, but it would necessarily record the same level of mobility in these 
processes. 
Mobility measures in common use are generally (weakly) relative; the relativist approach 
seems to be as dominant in the income mobility literature as it is in the theory of income 
inequality measurement." Indeed, the majority of analysts seem to be interested in the 
variation of the income shares or rank orders of the agents through time, and hence, conduct 
their analyses by means of strongly relative measures. Yet there is at least one — "largely 
ignored" — sense in which even a relative inequality adherent might not be satisfied with the 
performance of relative mobility indices which aim to capture the movement aspect of income 
mobility. While most people feel that the notions of income inequality and income growth 
are largely independent concepts, it seems reasonable to view the movement aspect of 
mobility as closely related with income growth. If Robinson Crusoe's income shifts from $0 
to $1000 in a given time interval, few of us would regard his one-person economy as highly 
immobile (in the sense of lack of movement). On the other hand, a relative mobility measure 
would assign the minimum level of mobility to this economy; a hardly pleasing result. 
Similarly, taking the growth dimension into account, one might justly maintain that there 
is more mobility in process V than in process IV, for everyone's income doubled in both 
cases, transformation V depicts twice as much income growth. Indeed, some people may 
choose to declare the process V as "twice as mobile as" process IV precisely for this reason. 
Generalizing this reasoning, therefore, one may argue that a transformation 
Xx~ Xy, X >0 involves exactly X times more movement than x - y for there is X times 
more (per capita) income growth in the former transformation than the latter. In other 
words, (positive) linear homogeneity may be viewed as a reasonable property at least for 
mobility indices which target the movement aspect of income mobility. 
On the other hand, invariance properties for inequality, poverty and/or mobility indices 
are, in general, motivated by the degree of coherence they introduce into the measurement 
exercise. Indeed, one would presumably like a "good" mobility measure to behave in a 
consistent manner when the variables of measurement go through certain kinds of 
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simultaneous changes. Therefore, if we accept the solution of relativity for (at least certain) 
mobility measures, we would need some other kind of invariance property that would provide 
a particular consistency check for indices of income movement. 
Among the invariance properties in accordance with the movement facet of income 
mobility is translation invariance which forces the analyst to focus on absolute changes in 
income levels of the constituent individuals rather than relative ones. Naturally enough, such 
measures are called absolute, and maintain that the level of mobility associated with a certain 
transformation would not be altered if the same dollar amount is added to everybody's 
income in both the initial and final distributions of this transformation. Consequently, among 
other things, absolute mobility measures allow one to talk about income mobility in terms 
of total dollars (or per capita dollars), and hence, may well prove useful in policy oriented 
mobility studies in a way analogous to absolute inequality indices (cf. Blackorby and 
Donaldson, 1980, p. 107).14 
Are there interesting absolute income mobility measures which satisfy linear 
homogeneity?15 We shall argue in section 3 that the answer to this question is yes, and 
demonstrate that such mobility measures (which may be called compromise mobility indices 
by analogy to the corresponding measures in the literature on income inequality; see Kolm, 
1976, and Ebert, 1988) possess a number of rather desirable properties.16 
2.4 Structural vs. exchange mobility 
As noted by Markandya (1982), pp. 307-8, "within the sociological literature a distinction 
is made between changes in mobility that can be attributed to the increased availability of 
positions in higher social classes and those changes that can be attributed to an increased 
intergenerational movement among social classes, for a given distribution of positions among 
these classes." (Emphasis in the original). Let us try to clarify these two types of mobility 
within the context of income mobility again by means of simple examples: 
VI: (1 ,2 ,3) -0 ,2 ,1) 
VII: (1,2,3)-(2,1,3) 
VIII: (1,2,3)-(1,2,6) 
IX: (1,2,3)-(2,3,6) 
Notice that the initial (anonymous) income distribution is preserved in processes VI and 
VII. In this sense, the structure of the economies in VI and VII did not change, and thus the 
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observed income mobility in both situations is due entirely to the movement of agents among 
the available income levels (classes). One may deem that process VI depicts more income 
mobility than VII solely because of the differences in exchange mobility, for the cross-
sectional distributions are identical between these two processes. On the other hand, we 
observe that the structures of the initial income distributions are altered in processes VIII and 
IX. Moreover, since the income ranks of the individuals are preserved, and since nobody's 
income is decreased, it may be reasonable to say that there is no exchange mobility in these 
processes; to the extent that IX is more mobile than VIII, the difference is due entirely to 
differences in structural mobility. 
Attempts have been made in the literature to date to decompose total mobility into 
exchange mobility and structural mobility components. For example, Markandya (1984) 
proposed two alternative procedures to do just that: (i) define exchange mobility as the 
proportion of the change in welfare that could have been obtained if the income distribution 
stayed constant through time, and let structural mobility be the balance of the total welfare 
change; (ii) define structural mobility as the change in welfare that would have taken place 
if there had been no mobility, and (this time) let exchange mobility be defined as the 
residual. It is not readily clear which procedure yields a more useful decomposition, and one 
might have to make a choice in this regard, for it is observed empirically that the conclusions 
of these two disaggregation procedures may be radically different (cf. Markandya, 1984)." 
All in all, the present literature on income mobility falls short of providing an exact, 
robust decomposition of total mobility into its basic sources. Nevertheless, there are some 
recent studies which seem promising in this regard; see, for instance, subsection 3.3 and 
Silber (1995). 
2.5 Transition matrices 
A considerable portion of the literature on income mobility measurement uses "transition 
matrices" rather than distributional transformations. Suppose that we have specified m 
income ranges by one criterion or another. The transition (mobility) matrix induced by a 
transformation x - y is then defined as the matrix P(x,y) = [prs(x,y)]eR'?an, where pjx,y) 
is the proportion of people that were in class r in the distribution x and have now moved 
to class s . By definition, we have E™= lpn (x,y) = 1 for all r , that is, a transition matrix is 
necessarily stochastic. 
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Transition matrices are particularly useful devices for summarizing the mobility content 
of distributional transformations. Indeed, they provide a simple picture of the "movement" 
of the individuals among the specified income classes, and they can thus be quite telling at 
times. Moreover, as we shall see in section 5, they can be related to stochastic models of 
income mobility in a natural way, letting one develop easily interpretable mobility measures 
only in terms of the transition matrices. 
Nonetheless, the simplicity provided by transition matrices comes at a cost; summarizing 
a distributional transformation by a transition matrix usually results in a loss of information. 
Indeed, one cannot in general recover the transformation that has induced the transition 
matrix by using only the information provided by the matrix. Moreover, the conclusions 
based on transition matrices are often robust with respect to the choice of income groups, and 
in any event, neglect the individual income variations that take place within the specified 
classes. Therefore, great care should be taken when conducting a transition matrix analysis, 
and perhaps the analysis must be supplemented by mobility measures that utilize directly the 
data from the distributional transformations. 
It is easy to demonstrate what may go wrong with studying mobility only in terms of 
transition matrices. Consider a society of 101 people, and suppose that we are interested in 
two income ranges: "below 5" (low income) and "above 5" (high income). Which one of 
the following two transformations exhibits more mobility? 
X: (1,...,1,10)-(10,...,10)10) 
XI: (1,10,...,10)-(10,1,10,...,10) 
Most people would presumably see more mobility in the process X than in XI due to the 
much larger number of persons who actually change classes in X. (While 100 people "move 
up" in X, only one person "moves up" and one person "moves down" in XI.) However, the 
0.99 0.01 
1 0 
1 0 
1 0 , while that induced by process XI is transition matrix associated with process X is 
adopting the convention that the first row and column correspond to the "high 
income" class. An analyst who is confronted with only these two transition matrices will be 
tempted to say that process X is less mobile than XI, for the latter matrix indicates that a 
larger fraction of the rich actually "moves down" in the process. 
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The paradoxical outcome of this particular transition matrix analysis is due to the 
radically different number of agents in the respective classes of the processes X and XI. This 
difficulty, however, could easily be avoided by defining the income classes so that there are 
always exactly n/m individuals in each group. Such transition matrices are called fractile 
matrices; a common example is the decile (or quintile) matrices where m = 10 (m = 5) and 
the 7-th group corresponds to the rth decile (quintile) of the distribution.18 As we shall see 
in subsection 4.3, fractile matrices are particularly useful for the analysis of mobility that is 
concerned with the rerankings of individuals through time, and/or with the persistence of 
relative poverty. 
However, mobility analyses based on fractile matrices are not without problems. First, 
a fractile matrix (like all transition matrices) ignores the income churning that takes place 
within subgroups. Second, it does not take into account the fact that the absolute income 
changes that are needed to move between classes would be radically different in the lower 
and higher fractiles due to the empirically observed positive-skewness of the income 
distributions. Finally, a fractile matrix may fail to reflect the effect of income growth on the 
mobility pattern of the society. For instance, the process, (1,10) - (1 +s, 10+ e) would be 
viewed as "completely stagnant" for any e > 0 by the fractile matrix of the transformation 
(with m=2). Naturally, one may argue that this is a reasonable conclusion since no rank 
reversal takes place in the process. Yet, one is presumably interested in 'rerankings' for 
reasons related to intertemporal equality, and the specified process is obviously an equalizing 
one. (In fact, the second period distribution leads to perfect equality as e - °°). This aspect 
would have been completely missed, had we evaluated the process only in terms of an 
associated fractile matrix. 
Of course, this does not mean that fractile matrices should not be used in practice. They 
are indeed very useful devices in assessing the essential "reranking" content of distributional 
transformations, and they help us answer questions related to low income dynamics and 
persistence of (relative) poverty. Rather, we maintain that, given the multifarious nature of 
"income mobility", it might be useful to complement other fractile mobility analyses with 
other mobility measurement methods. We shall return to this point later in the survey. 
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3. An Axiomatic Approach to Income Movement Measurement 
We have argued above that an important facet of the income mobility concept concerns the 
movement of incomes through time. But how can one measure movements of incomes? In 
this section, we shall attempt to answer this question drawing upon the recent axiomatic 
approaches developed by Fields and Ok (1998) and Mitra and Ok (1998). 
3.1 A class of absolute mobility measures 
As noted in Fields and Ok (1996), asking how much income mobility has taken place in 
x -y may be rephrased as asking how distant x and y have become for an appropriate 
distance function dn:R. -if+.19 This basic idea is, in fact, more powerful than it first 
seems. To see this, suppose that we are interested in absolute income mobility, and thus, 
wish to view the distance function as measuring the total absolute income movement 
observed in a given distributional transformation. In view of the discussion presented in 
subsection 2.3, therefore, two basic assumptions to posit on dn are translation invariance 
(TI) and linear homogeneity (LH).20 
We may introduce further structure to the measurement problem by postulating the 
following fundamental axiom: 
WeakDecomposability (WD). For n s 2 
dn{x,y) = Gn(dl(xlyl),...,dl(xn,yn)) 
for some symmetric, nonzero, strictly increasing and continuous Gn: R? - Rt. 
This postulate clarifies the nature of the income mobility concept we are seeking here, 
namely, that of the aggregate income movement. (This interpretation should be kept in mind 
throughout this section). One may view WD as a fundamental axiom that any measure of 
income movement should satisfy. Indeed, this property asserts that total income mobility is 
a nontrivial and strictly increasing function of the personal mobility levels of the constituents 
of the society. In other words, GB is basically a function that aggregates the individual 
income movements. While continuity of this function is a standard regularity assumption, 
the symmetry of it ensures the impartial treatment of each agent. 
Now, it seems plausible that the level of total movement would never decrease upon 
addition of an individual to the population, and would be unaltered if the new individual 
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experienced no income change. A slight strengthening of this idea is that, in the context of 
populations of different sizes, if equals are added to equals, the results are equal. (Recall 
that we are seeking a total movement measure at the moment; per capita movement measures 
will be taken up later). This leads us to the following independence property: 
Population Consistency (PC). For m.3, x^eR"'1, z,weR"~2 and a,fc^O 
<*„_i (x, y) = 4,_2 (z, w) implies dn ((x, a), (y, b)) = dK„x ((z, a), (w, b)). 
It is, in fact, possible to obtain a two-parameter characterization of the class of measures 
induced by these axioms: 
Fact 1: (Mitra and Ok, 1998) Let the distance functions {dn: R2" - Rt: n a 1} satisfy Tl, 
LH, WD, and PC. Then, and only then, there exist a £ 1 and y >0 such that 
dn(x,y) = y(EU \x, -yt |")1/a for all x.yeR?* 
This is a quite useful observation yielding a familiar class of movement measures 
axiomatically. As long as one's intuition about (total) movement is in accordance with the 
above axioms, therefore, the "right" mobility index must be of the form of a Euclidean 
distance. Nevertheless, Fact 1 has limited applicability, for the characterized class still 
contains uncountably many measures, none of which is "obviously" better than the others. 
In what follows, we consider two ways of overcoming this problem. 
3.2 An income movement index 
Fields and Ok (1996) propose a separability axiom for income movement measures to the 
effect that the marginal contribution of one individual's income change to total movement is 
independent of the other agents' personal mobility levels: 
Individualistic Contribution (IC). For any n^2 and x,y, z, wei?" such that *j =Zj and 
dn(x,y) -dn(x,(xlty2,...,yn)) =dn(z,w) -<f)1(z,(z1)w2,...,w|I)) 
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Although this postulate might be considered less compelling than the previous ones, the 
implications of it seem worth exploring since such separability axioms are commonly used 
in the economics of choice and welfare. Indeed, the implications of this strong axiom also 
tum out to be strong. In our setting, IC, in fact, refines the class of measures obtained in 
Fact 1 to a singleton: 
Fact 2: (Fields and Ok, 1996) Let {dn:nz.\} satisfy TI, LH, WD, PC and IC, and 
assume that dx (1,0) = dx (0,1) = 1 as a normalization. Then, and only then, 
dn(x,\y) =d°(x,y)*T,ll | x. -y,. | for all*, y e * ; . " 
That is, given a natural normalization condition, the unique (total) income mobility measure 
characterized by the above axioms is the sum of the absolute values of income changes for 
each individual in the society. 
Of course, a total mobility measure may cause problems when the sizes of the groups 
being analyzed vary. Therefore, in empirical applications, one might rather be interested in 
per capita and/or percentage mobility measurement. But once dn is accepted as a 
satisfactory measure of total movement, we readily obtain per capita and percentage 
movement indices as 
mn (x,y) = ! and pn (x,y) = '•—'-, 
respectively. (The analogy with the notions of total, per capita and percentage, say 
GNP-growth, is straightforward.) These descriptive indicators are likely to be more useful 
than dn in measuring the movement aspect of income mobility in practice.23 
3.3 Decomposition of dn 
As noted above, the literature has not until now produced a mobility measure that is 
decomposable into components akin to "structural mobility" and "exchange mobility" as used 
by sociologists in thinking about occupational mobility. However, it is not difficult to 
establish that the mobility indices dn,mn, and e„ are exactly decomposable into analogous 
components as follows. 
Gary S. Fields and Efe A. Ok 571 
Let us first define the basic concept of movement due to a transfer of income. This 
involves transfers of income from some individuals to others, holding total income the same. 
Take for instance the transfer of $3 from individual 3 to individual 1: (1,2,3) -(4,2,0) 
Using d°, total mobility is $6, because $3 is gained by individual 1 and $3 is lost by 
individual 3. More generally, given x-y with E " . ^ a E ^ x , we may define total 
movement due to the transfer of income T(x,y) as twice the amount lost by the losers, i.e., 
rCr,y)=2/ E (x.-y/U 
("Twice" because every dollar lost by a loser is gained by a winner.)24 Yet, in a shrinking 
economy wherein Y^,i yf <. T.nul x; total movement due to the transfer of income, T(x,y) is 
instead defined as twice the amount won by the winners. 
The next concept is movement due to economic growth. When growth occurs, winners 
can win without anyone losing. Suppose that someone experiences an income gain because 
of economic growth, e.g., (1,2,3) - (1,2,6). Using <f°, total mobility is $3, all attributable 
to the gain in income for individual 3. More generally, given x-y with T,",lyi>Yl*„1xj 
we define total movement due to economic growth in terms of the usual measure of economic 
growth: K(x,y) s E",j yt - E".xxt. Likewise, in a shrinking economy, total movement due 
to economic contraction is defined as K'(x, y) = E",j xi - E",] yL. 
We may now state the following decomposition result: 
Fact 3: (Fields and Ok, 1996) Let n i l and x,y efl". 
(a) If £?.! y, * E?., x,, then d° (x,y) = T(x,y) + K(x,y) 
(b) If E?., yt * £?., x,, then d°n (x,y) = T\x,y) + K'(x,y) 
The per capita mobility and percentage mobility measures m„ and pn may be decomposed 
similarly. 
By virtue of these decompositions, we conclude that dn,mn and pn satisfy two 
important properties. First, they are sensitive to transfers of income in the sense that, for 
given initial and final income totals, the larger are the absolute values of income changes for 
the constituent individuals, the more income mobility there is. Second, they are sensitive to 
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improved (or diminished) economic opportunities in the aggregate, i.e., given a fixed level 
of transfer mobility, the larger the change in total income in the cross-sectional income 
distributions, the more mobility there is. For those who believe that income mobility is a 
function of both of these components, therefore, these mobility indices present themselves 
as useful measures of movement-mobility. 
3.4 A partial ordering approach 
In subsection 3.1, we presented a number of appealing axioms for income movement 
measures and obtained the class of mobility indices entailed by these axioms. Mitra and Ok 
(1998) go on to define the following partial mobility ordering of income distribution 
transformations: x-y is more mobile than z^w (written as (x-y) >MO(z-w)) if, and only 
if, x-*y is declared more mobile than z - w by all mobility measures (defined as distance 
functions) which satisfy TT, LH, WD and PC. In view of Fact 1, we have 
C*-y) >*o(z~w) if and onJy tf Er. i l*i-yj I* * E"«i U r w . 1° for aii a * 1 . 
As stressed by Mitra and Ok (1998, p. 95), "the intuitive support of the proposed 
mobility ordering, is rather similar to that of the Lorenz ordering ... Whenever a 
transformation is ranked higher by this ordering than the other, there is a clear sense in 
which one may conclude that the former process is unambiguously more mobile than the 
latter." 
There is, however, an obvious problem with the ordering >M0: its dependence on the 
parameter a . Indeed, this dependence makes it practically impossible to rank, distributional 
transformations by >MO except in trivial cases. Nevertheless, there are some easy-to-check 
sets of sufficient conditions (which do not depend on the parameter o) for >uo to apply. 
An illustration follows: 
Fact 4: (Mitra and Ok, 1998). For any x, y, z, w eR ", n s 1, (x - y) >MO (z - w) holds if, 
and only if, 
Ef-i A,(x,y) * £ ? . , A^z.w) for k = l,...,n. 
where A^x.y) is the i'th largest element of [\xr-yr\:r=l, ...,n) (and similarly 
for Aj(z,w)). 
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Consider the transformations (3,5,9) - (13,8,1) and (2,10,4) - (11,19,6) for example. 
Can we rank these transformations by >MO! (Or better, ask yourself which transformation 
exhibits more movement than the other?) An easy application of Fact 4 shows that one can 
indeed: the former transformation is "unambiguously" more mobile than the latter. 
Mitra and Ok (1998) provide several other sets of sufficient conditions which are 
considerably stronger than those reported in Fact 4. However, while these conditions may 
prove adequate in enabling one to apply >uo in some practical cases, they do not reflect 
the full potential of this descriptive mobility ordering. Obtaining a parameter-free 
characterization of >MO remains as an open problem at the moment. 
3.5 A final note 
We have found above that the axiomatic method provides one with powerful tools to analyze 
the income mobility observed in a given distributional transformation. Indeed, as long as one 
wishes to study the aggregate income movement observed in a given transformation on the 
basis of individual income changes, the techniques summarized above might well prove 
useful. Yet it is important to note that this particular measurement theory should not be 
expected to be suitable for all studies concerning income mobility. For instance, if one is 
viewing the notion of mobility in terms of "independence of final period income from initial 
income level," then the above approach is obviously not the right one to follow (recall 
subsection 2.2). ' 
Similarly, if one's concept of mobility is sensitive to the rerankings of the agents, none 
of the mobility measures discussed above is appropriate (see section 4.1 for more on this). 
To see this, notice that dB((10,20), (10 + e ,20-e) ) is a continuous function of e on 
[0,10], while one may wish to have a jump discontinuity at e =5 due to the occurrence of 
the rank reversal. Indeed, the fractile matrix of the distributional transformation 
(10,20) -(10 + e, 20 - e) would be 1 0 0 1 for all 0 £. e < 5, and 
0 1 
1 0 for all 5 < e s l 0 , a n d 
this in turn indicates that there is a rank reversal at e =5. On the other hand, while dn 
captures the "movements" that occur in the process for 0 s s < 5 , the associated fractile 
matrix would fail to do so. 
The upshot of this example is that the mobility measurement technique outlined above 
and the usual approach based on fractile matrices are essentially complementary; movement-
574 The Measurement of Income Mobility 
mobility analysis would be enriched if both methodologies were to be employed 
simultaneously.25 
4. Welfarist Approaches to Income Mobility Measurement 
There is a sizable literature which studies the measurement of income (and social) 
mobility from a welfarist angle.26 In this literature, "mobility is seen in terms of its 
implications rather than from a direct consideration of what is meant by mobility" (Atkinson, 
1981, p.71). Of course, as Markandya (1982, p. 457), puts it "the presumption here is that 
a society becomes mobile as a result of the removal of social impediments, which prevent 
individuals from having an economic role that fully utilizes their natural abilities, and the 
removal of social privileges, which give them roles that could be better performed by 
someone else." In this sense, welfarist studies usually view income mobility from the origin 
independence angle, and in fact, sometimes identify it with the notion of equality of 
opportunity. In such studies, income mobility is thus valued on its own right (but see 
Conlisk, 1974, and Atkinson, 1980.)27 ' 
The first step in devising a welfarist income mobility measure is, of course, to specify 
a social welfare function (SWF) associating an income distribution stream with a (cardinal) 
level of aggregate welfare.28 Given the social welfare function, a variety of methods can be 
used to extract a particular mobility measure. In the following subsections, we examine a 
number of such methods.29 
4.1 King's index 
In an influential study, King (1983) suggests that summary statistics of the rerankings 
observed in the transformation x - y can be interpreted as mobility measures. To outline the 
basic elements of King's approach, let z; stand for the income level agent i would have 
obtained if his/her rank order did not alter during the process x~y, and consider an 
intertemporal SWF W:R?.~R defined as W= W(x,y) =w(y,j) where w:R?-R is any 
continuous and strictly increasing function and s = (s1,...,sn) with st = —'-—— for all i -30 
So long as one wishes to measure income mobility only in terms of rank orders of 
individuals, (s)he must agree that there is no mobility in x -y whenever s=0n where 
0 = (0 , . . . , 0 )eR\ Then, however, the index M(x,y)= 1 where 
" 9(x,v) 
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w@(x,y)y,Oii)=w(y,s) 
measures the proportion of total income which one would be just willing to sacrifice in order 
to have the degree of mobility (rerankings) we observe in x -y rather than having no 
mobility.31 (By the continuity and monotonicity assumptions, Ofoy) is well-defined and 
6 f e y ) i l ) . 
By postulating strong assumptions on the structure of w therefore, we may obtain 
specific mobility indices. For instance, if 
w(y,s) = 
±ZZ.liyle1'>)\i\+0 
£"=i ( logy, + YSi).n = 0 
we have King's mobility index: 
Mk(x,y) = \ Q(x,y) 
E n r\ Vn 
ZUyS'V 
1-exp ^ - E " , ! ^ 
n 
,r\ #0 
, n = 0 
Here y £ 0 represents the degree of immobility aversion (see Chakravarty, 1984, for a 
generalization of this mobility measure). 
We stress that King's index (and more generally 1 • -) is derived only in terms of 
6(*,y) 
the rank order changes in a given transformation x-*y. Therefore, one should be careful in 
interpreting the conclusions of MK which is likely to yield somewhat extreme results at 
times. For instance, King's index (and his approach in general) sees the same level of 
income mobility in the processes (1,2)-(1,2) and (1,2)-(1,200) namely zero level of 
mobility; a hardly intuitive conclusion. MK, therefore, presents itself as a useful tool only 
in estimating the welfare value of the aggregate rerankings of a given distributional 
transformation. 
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It is illuminating to compare the behavior of King's index with d° introduced in 
subsection 3.2. While d° ranks the mobility of (1,2)-(1,200) higher than (1,2)-(1,2) it 
is by definition insensitive to rerankings of the individuals through time. For instance, while 
d° sees the same mobility in the process (1,2) -(1,4) as in (1,2) -(3,2), King's index ranks 
the latter transformation "more mobile" than the former in accordance with the intuition that 
rerankings matter. Unfortunately, the present literature falls short of developing a 
measurement method which incorporate both the number of dollars moved and the number 
of rerankings that have occurred in a distributional transformation. This important task 
remains to be fulfilled in future research. 
4.2 Chakravarty-Dutta-Weymark index 
In their important contribution to ethical measurement of income mobility, Chakravarty, 
Dutta and Weymark (1985) focus on welfarist measures of strongly relative income mobility, 
and like Shorrocks (1993), declare the transformation x-y as completely immobile if, and 
X- y 
only if, the income shares of individuals are maintained through time, i.e., ' - ' H(*) n(y) 
for all i. Consequently, the process x - ^^ x is deemed to exhibit complete (relative) 
H(*) 
immobility. 
Now consider an intertemporal SWF W:Rt* - R such that W= W(x,y) =w(x+y) where 
W:R?-R is any continuous, strictly increasing and strictly S-concave function. By 
monotonicity and continuity of W there exists a unique a (x,y) which satisfies 
WQc.JtMx) . w ( ( l + J ! M ) i ) =w(a(r ,y) l . ) , \i(x) n(x 
and a unique P(x,y) which satisfies 
W(x,y) = w(x+y) = w(P(x,v)lB) . 
In this context as others, a (x,y) is the equally distributed equivalent income of the 
(hypothetical) immobile transformation n - — i , and P(x,y) is the equally distributed 
u(*) 
equivalent income of x-y. Clearly, x-y exhibits complete (relative) immobility if, and only 
if, a (x,y) = p (x,y) and higher mobility the higher is the ratio "^x 'yJ. Consequently, we 
«(*.y) 
may define the following mobility index: 
M(x,y),<pf!^ 
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where <p: J?+t - R is continuous and strictly increasing. Moreover, by choosing <p(s) = 1 - s , 
one obtains the Chakravarty-Dutta-Weymark mobility index 
« fey) 
which "measures mobility as the percentage change in the equally distributed equivalent 
income of the actual aggregate distribution compared with what it would be with the 
immobile benchmark structure" (Chakravarty et al., 1985, p. 6).32 
The most striking feature of MCDW is its tendency to distinguish between desirable and 
undesirable mobility patterns. For instance, it indicates that there is more (ethical) mobility 
in the transformation (1,9)-(5,5) than in (5,5)-(1,9). However, the above approach 
assesses the desirability of the mobility exclusively in terms of income inequality, and 
ignores, among other things, efficiency matters. For example, M^^ does not see any 
desirable mobility in (1,1) -(2,2) while the final income distribution here is unambiguously 
better than the initial one. The problem may be solved if we change our focus from relative 
mobility to absolute (or compromise) mobility, and incorporate the growth aspect of mobility 
explicitly into the measurement analysis (see subsections 2.4 and 2.5). In addition, MCDW 
is derived via a SWF which depends only on the total income received by the agents through 
time; there is clearly a need for relaxing this structural assumption and considering broader 
classes of SWFs. These routes remain to be pursued in future research. 
4.3 Atkinson's income mobility ordering 
In a well-known paper, Atkinson (1981) develops "... 'dominance' conditions under which 
we can rank mobility processes for a class of social welfare functions satisfying certain 
general properties. This does not allow a complete ranking; we may be able to rank one 
process as leading to a higher level of social welfare than some, but not all, other processes" 
(Atkinson, 1981, p. 71). His approach is best demonstrated by transforming the original data 
reported in x-y into percentile classes and by confining attention to the mobility of 
individuals among these groupings. Consequently, we assume that a fixed percentage of the 
population is assigned to each class, that each class is given a certain rank, and that mobility 
is measured in terms of the number of ranks moved by each person during the transition 
period. That is, we represent the transformation by the fractile transition matrix 
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P(x,y) s [p„(x,y)] eR"^" where pn(x,y) is the proportion of the people that were in class r 
in the distribution x and have now moved to class s (recall subsection 2.5). In what 
follows, we shall assume that the r * fractile of the population is assigned to rank (income 
status) r, r = l,...,m. 
A transition matrix Q = [qn] eR?"™ is said to be obtained from -P s [p ,J eR?*™ by a 
diagonalizing switch if 
Irs =Prs + 6 > 1r,S*l = Pr,s*l ~ 6 > 4r+U = Pr+l,s ~ 6 a n d <?r*U*l =Pr*l,s*l + 5 
ds 
where 6 >0; we write P - Q if <? can be obtained from i> by finitely many such switches. 
Since by means of finitely many diagonalizing switches, we can transform any bistochastic 
transition matrix to the identity matrix (which presumably exhibits the minimum possible 
level of mobility), there is a sense in which any diagonalizing switch reduces income 
mobility. In other words, one might argue that x-y exhibits more mobility than z~w 
ds 
whenever P(x,y) - Q(x,y). This idea is the premise behind Atkinson's mobility ordering, 
>., defined as 
ds 
(x~y) >A (x-iv) if and only if P(x,y) - Q(x,y) .M 
Is there ethical support for Atkinson's ordering? Atkinson (1981) gives an affirmative 
answer, and shows that (x-y) >A(z-\v) implies that 
E"1E*,p„(Jc,y)f/(r1s) i. T,%lL",ipr3(.z,w)U(r,s) 
for all twice continuously differentiable social evaluation functions U:R<.-~R such that 
£ 0.34 In other words, (utilitarian) social welfare is diminished by a diagonalizing 
6r5s 
switch if the effect of a switch from state s to s+1 in the final period has a stronger impact 
on the social evaluation function if the switching individual was in state r rather than r+1 
in the initial period. Consequently, >A appears to have significant ethical support from a 
utilitarian angle as long as one views the negativity of the cross partials as a reasonable 
requirement on the social evaluation function. 
A point worth noting about >A is that it does not adhere to the notion of income mobility 
from the equality of opportunity (or, origin independence) perspective. Indeed, it is easily 
seen that a distributional transformation represented by the transition matrix would 1/4 3/4 3/4 1/4 
be ranked more mobile by >A than the transformation represented by the transition matrix 
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1/2 1/2 
1/2 1/2 ' *l t n u s s e e m s m a t Atkinson's notion of income mobility is concerned not with 
equality of opportunity but rather with income movements (see subsection 5.1 for more on 
this). Since >A is primarily an ethical ordering of mobility and since the welfare value of 
the mobility for the society is usually prescribed in terms of equality of opportunity (or 
temporal independence), this observation is thought provoking. 
Finally, we stress that although Atkinson's ordering is couched in a parallel way to the 
celebrated Lorenz ordering, the bivariate structure of the mobility measurement problem 
makes the ethical support of this ordering less apparent. Indeed, in contrast with univariate 
income inequality measurement theory, the mobility analysis here appears to have a strong 
utilitarian rooting. Moreover, it is not so clear why it is desirable that the social valuation 
function have negative cross partials. Of course, one's skepticism about >A can be traced 
back to the primitives of Atkinson's measurement theory, the diagonalizing switches. It 
seems to us that the presumption that any diagonalizing switch decreases mobility is suspect 
when pn does not belong to the diagonal of p(xy). After all, it may be argued that if some 
people move up one class more and an equal number move up one class less, one may want 
to conclude that mobility is, in fact, unchanged (cf. Fields and Ok, 1996). 
Leaving this caveat aside, we conclude by noting that Atkinson's approach is undoubtedly 
a pioneering one paving way towards a general theory of ordinal measurement of income 
mobility. 
4.4 Mobility measures based on social utility variations 
In section 3 we considered a number of mobility measures which are defined as certain 
additively separable aggregations of individual income changes. As pointed out in footnote 
16, one shortcoming of such mobility measures is that they tend to view the distributional 
transformations (2,1000) -(2,1001) and (2,1000) -(3,1000) as equally mobile. Indeed, for 
those analysts who wish to rank the mobilities of these transformations on the basis of 
changes in individual welfare levels, the law of diminishing returns would provide a 
justification for the argument that the latter process is more mobile than the former. This 
suggests defining mobility indices of the form 
f"(.x,y) = - £ \U(y) - U(x)\ for all x,yeRl 
n j=i 
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where U:R?, -i? is a strictly increasing and concave function. Once again U is interpreted 
here as a social evaluation (utility) function of a social planner (or as the utility function of 
the representative agent) as is usual in welfare economics. Consequently, f"(x,y) is basically 
thought of as the per capita aggregate change in the individual social utility levels 
experienced during the process x - y according to the utilitarian social welfare functional.35 
Clearly, if U is strictly concave, f" declares (2,1000) - (3,1000) as strictly more mobile 
than (2,1000) - (2,1001) in accordance with the above mentioned intuition. By the same 
token, such measures (with a strictly concave U defined over the set of income ranks 
[l,...,m]) also satisfy Atkinson's diagonalizing switch axiom discussed above. 
It is worth mentioning that any /„ can be decomposed into growth and transfer 
components (defined in terms of utility) in precisely the way we have described in subsection 
3.3. Moreover, any / , enjoys an additional separability property which may prove quite 
useful in applications: subgroup decomposability. Indeed, for any partitioning of the society, 
/„" computes the overall mobility as a weighted average of the subgroup mobility levels 
where weights are chosen to be the population shares of the subgroups.36 Just as in the 
theory of poverty measurement (cf., Foster, Greer and Thorbecke, 1984), the basic appeal 
of subgroup decomposability lies in its promise for empirical applications, for it lets one 
determine exactly the contribution of any population subgroup (which may be defined 
according to the ethnic, occupational and/or geographic origin) to the overall mobility of the 
society (see Fields and Ok, 1999, for a further discussion of the issue). 
Now, given the definition of /„ , we may obtain a particularly interesting class of 
mobility measures by confining our attention to social evaluation functions with constant 
relative risk aversion (as in the seminal work of Atkinson, 1970). As is well known, the 
members of this class are necessarily of the form 
U°(a) 0s a#l 1 _ a for all a > 0 . 
loga, a-I 
Let us denote the class of all mobility indices induced by these utility functions in the way 
prescribed above by Q. 
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u° o An immediate observation is that /„ = mn , that is, the only absolute mobility measure 
in Q is the per capita (total) mobility index we have (independently) characterized in 
subsection 3.2. On the other hand, the only relative member of Q is the per capita 
aggregate change of log incomes, that is, the index defined as 
f?Qcj) = - £ I log - I for all x,y eR^.« 
n t.i xt 
This is an interesting movement-mobility measure which might be an appealing 
alternative to mn . We refer the reader to Fields and Ok (1999) for a detailed investigation 
of the desirable properties of /„ , and an axiomatic characterization of this particular 
measure which provides a formal justification for concentrating on log-incomes in mobility 
analyses. 
In conclusion, we stress that all of the measures considered in this subsection are 
measures of mobility which seek to measure the aggregate income variation observed in a 
given distributional transformation. Therefore, their normative significance is not readily 
apparent (see footnote 10), and they do not attach a particular weight to rerankings of 
individuals beyond what is implied by the associated social utility changes. Their conclusions 
must therefore be supplemented by those of other mobility measures. One method of doing 
this is to use directionalized versions of /„ ; this- issue too is discussed formally in Fields 
and Ok (1999). 
5. The Markovian Approach to Mobility Measurement 
5.1 Temporal independence vs. aggregate movement 
By its very nature, income mobility is primarily concerned with the time path of the income 
distribution among identified individuals in a given society. It is therefore not surprising that 
much of the literature on income mobility measurement utilizes stochastic processes in 
modeling the generation of such time paths. The most popular example is the simple Markov 
chain model of mobility where the transitions across agents are independent. The essential 
primitive of this model is the transition (mobility) matrix of the chain, P = [ p j e/?!™3" where 
ptj stands for the probability of moving to income state j from income state i within a unit 
interval of time. (Of course, £".,/>..=! and m is the number of income states.)38 When one 
582 The Measurement of Income Mobility 
thinks of P as specifying an intertemporal income distribution sequence, for example, p.. 
may stand for the probability that a parent in income state i will have an offspring in state 
j . (Given this interpretation, therefore, we may interpret the probability vector 
(pa,"-,Pim) as the lottery that an agent with a parent from state i faces.) In an 
intragenerational setting, on the other hand, one usually views the generated income streams 
as individuals' incomes in successive periods, or as lifetime earnings. 
Shorrocks (1978) provides a careful examination of income mobility measures which are 
defined as continuous functions of the form M:P~R.39 He suggests the following property 
for such measures: M(I) <. M(P) s M(Q) where / is the mxm identity matrix and Q is any mxm 
transition matrix all rows of which are identical. Therefore, the identity matrix is assigned 
the least level of mobility, for such a mobility matrix generates no transitions between 
income states. On the contrary, a mobility matrix with identical rows is assigned the largest 
level of mobility since such a matrix induces perfect temporal (origin) independence (Prais, 
1955). 
It must be clear at this point that this latter property is only desirable from a temporal 
dependence point of view; for instance, when assessing the degree to which an offspring's 
income state is determined by that of the parent in an intergenerational framework. If, on 
the other hand, one chooses to approach the notion of income mobility from the perspective 
of total movement rather than that of temporal independence, the axiom is clearly no longer 
[ 1/2 1/21 
suitable (recall subsection 2.2). For example, while 1/2 1/2 is a transition matrix which 
01 
10 Shorrocks' postulate requires exhibits unambiguously less movement than the matrix 
that the former matrix be more mobile than the latter one (cf. Bartholomew, 1982 and 
Kanbur and Stiglitz, 1986). Indeed, this example illustrates that the monotonicity postulate 
of Shorrocks (1978), which requires that, for all transition matrices P andQ, M(P) > M(Q) 
whenever />,-.• £ <?<.- for all i*j with at least one of the inequalities holding strictly, is 
incompatible with the above property. This observation teaches us once more that one has 
to be rather careful in specifying the precise nature of the mobility notion that is targeted in 
the measurement exercise.40 
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5.2 Monotone mobility matrices 
It has recently been pointed out by several authors that the class of all mobility matrices is 
simply too large to work with, and there is, in fact, a useful way of refining this class. To 
introduce this refinement, let us adopt the convention that income state i is represented by 
income level x(. and the income states are ordered from lowest income to highest. Illustrating 
in an intragenerational context, it seems natural to postulate that an agent starting in income 
state i is better off than starting in state i+1. Yet xt zxM does not guarantee this; a 
(regular) transition matrix may well generate a higher lifetime expected income for an agent 
starting at a lower state. However, we may rule out this possibility by requiring that row 
i+1 of the transition matrix stochastically dominate row i. (In an intragenerational 
framework, for instance, this amounts to the sensible requirement that an agent faces a better 
lottery in state i +1 than i). This observation leads one to confine attention to monotone 
mobility matrices first introduced by Keilson and Ketser (1977). 
A transition matrix p is said to be monotone if, for all i = l,...,m - 1, 
'
£j'iPi*ij*'Lj_1pij, k=\,...,m-\. 
As noted by Conlisk (1990), monotonicity appears to be a compelling property to posit on 
mobility matrices; it is intuitively appealing and is empirically verified by many studies (cf. 
Adelman, 1958, Shorrocks, 1976, Bartholomew, 1982 and Dardanoni and Forcina, 1993). 
Moreover, confining attention to monotone (and regular) transition matrices provides one 
with considerable analytic structure that leads to many interesting results concerning income 
mobility measurement. We present here two examples. 
Example 1: (Dardanoni, 1995) Consider two Markovian transition matrices P and Q such 
that the "expected" income distribution at time f-1 under the process generated by P is 
more equal (in the Lorenz sense) than that generated by <?.41 A natural question is this: 
under what circumstances will the "expected" income distribution at time J under the process 
induced by P remain more equal than that induced by Q.a The answer to this question is 
quite complicated in general. But if we assume that P is monotone, then one obtains a 
definitive answer very easily: the income distribution generated by P at time t will remain 
more equal than that generated by Q if, and only if, P stochastically dominates Q; that is, 
£*„!/>£ * E*.i qv for all k = l,...,m - 1, i = l,...,m 
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(Dardanoni, 1995, Proposition l).43 In other words, this result "tells us that when the 
transition matrix of the society with a dominating income distribution is monotone, a 
necessary and sufficient condition, for the preservation of the dominance relation in the 
following snapshot is stochastic dominance of the transition matrix" (Dardanoni, 1995, p. 
185). 
Example 2: (Dardanoni, 1993) Consider an intragenerational Markovian model of income 
mobility with the transition matrix P. Let Xt(P;6) denote the (normalized) expected 
discounted lifetime income of an infinitely lived agent where 6e [0,1] is the discount factor; 
that is, let X^P-,6) be the ith element of 
X(P:S) * ( l - 5 ) E : , 0 6 ' ( x / " ) = A : ( ( 1 - 6 ) [ / - 6 P ] - 1 ) * xP(5) . 
By regularity of P there exists a unique (strictly positive) equilibrium probability vector TC 
(which, evidently, identifies the steady-state income distribution). We may thus consider a 
Bergson-Samuelson type SWF that aggregates the expected discounted lifetime incomes of 
the agents as a weighted sum: 
W:X(.P;6)-'ZllizikiXi(P;6). 
Of course, if we assume that P is monotone, then starting at a lower income state is 
necessarily a disadvantage so that a natural fairness argument demands that we assume 
A.j s .. a km a 0. Then, however, given the discount factor 5 we can unambiguously rank 
two regular monotone transition matrices P and Q with the same equilibrium probability 
vector II as follows: 
P>DQ if and only if E™, *f \ Xt (/>: 6) * E ^ , TT, Xi X((.Q; 8) 
for all A.12..^Ams0 and all ^ . . . s i , . 4 4 (Notice that without the monotonicity 
assumption, >D is not necessarily a sensible ordering, for then the condition Xx z... ;> Xm i 0 
cannot be justified on the basis of fairness.) The binary relation >D, which we refer to as 
Dardanoni's ordering, is a particularly interesting mobility ordering since, as noted in 
Dardanoni (1993, p. 379), it "may be considered (as) the infinite horizon extension to 
Atkinson's ordering of bistochastic transition matrices for a two period society" which was 
analyzed in subsection 4.3. 
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Before concluding this example, we note that >D is, in fact, very easy to check for a 
given 8 , because one can show that, for any monotone and regular P and Q with the same 
equilibrium vector, we have 
P>DQ if and only if T'lLP(6)T<.T'TIQ(b)T 
where T is the mxm upper triangular matrix with zeros below the main diagonal and ones 
elsewhere, and II is the diagonal matrix with the equilibrium probability vector ir on the 
diagonal.45 
These examples illustrate that considerable progress can be made theoretically by 
concentrating only on monotone Markov chains (identified by monotone transition matrices) 
in modeling the time paths of distributions of income. Nevertheless, the problem of income 
mobility measurement can hardly be considered as "solved" upon introduction of monotone 
mobility matrices; there are several tasks left for future work. First of all, Dardanoni's 
ordering can rank only mobility matrices with the same steady-state income distribution, 
which is unlikely to arise in practice if the matrices summarize movements among income 
classes. Therefore, it will be useful to find a way to extend >D in a way to dispense with 
this requirement but such an extension will introduce considerations of structural mobility 
into the analysis, and we are thus led to the problems of decomposition.46 It would be quite 
interesting to see if monotonicity of the mobility matrices will prove useful in this regard. 
Finally, one must eventually search for the ethical support of Dardanoni's ordering outside 
the span of Bergson-Samuelson type social welfare functions. 
5.3 A caveat 
The standard Markovian model of income mobility is not without problems. Among others, 
it is based on two assumptions the validity of which is neither empirically nor theoretically 
evident: (1) the transition probabilities are constant over time (i.e., the Markov chain is 
stationary); (2) the probability of going from one state to the other is independent of past 
history (i.e., the Markov chain is of first-order)." The first assumption is troubling since 
it may result in a considerable degree of information loss with respect to the inherent 
mobility exhibited in a given time interval. One can, of course, relax this assumption and 
rather focus on time dependent Markov chains, but this leads to quite a complicated 
stochastic process where the tractability of the standard model is unrecoverably lost. The 
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second assumption, on the other hand, is refuted by a number of empirical studies (cf. 
Shorrocks, 1976, Atoda and Tachibanaki, 1980, and Atkinson et al., 1992).48 
We are therefore at an uneasy crossroads. The first order stationary (and monotone) 
Markov chain model provides an analytically tractable framework for a fruitful analysis of 
income mobility, at least theoretically. But one pays a high price for the "nice" structure this 
model provides, for the two strong assumptions noted above may not hold empirically. In 
the final analysis, the decision regarding whether or not a Markovian approach should be 
adopted for a particular income mobility analysis, appears to be a subjective and 
context-dependent question. 
6. A Final Synopsis 
The income mobility literature is still distressingly far from being unified on how to measure 
mobility and make mobility comparisons. In part, this is presumably because of lack of 
agreement on what the underlying concept is, but this is also due to the wide gap (with a few 
notable exceptions) between those who devise measures of income mobility and those who 
measure mobility empirically. 
One must recall that the inequality literature made genuine progress when empirical and 
theoretical researchers combined their forces, and there emerged powerful methods of 
measuring income inequality commanding almost unanimous approval. Moreover, the related 
literature was able to provide a unified framework within which competing techniques could 
be studied, and eventually it became clear where the differences lay and what the answers 
depended upon. 
It appears that mobility analysts can beneficially follow the lead of inequality analysts 
by asking similar kinds of questions: 
(1) What do I mean by income mobility? What particular aspects of it am I 
interested in measuring? What is the normative significance of these aspects? 
(2) What sort of a measurement methodology should I use to make ordinal mobility 
comparisons? 
(3) Given my answer to (1), how, axiomatically or otherwise, do I justify the choice 
of my measurement methodology? Is there an aspect of mobility that this 
technique misses? What are the remedies? 
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As this survey has attempted to clarify, the notion of mobility is truly multi-dimensional, 
and the social welfare importance of each of these dimensions varies. Even when one is 
absolutely clear about what aspect of mobility s/he is interested in measuring, we lack 
measurement techniques which are as widely accepted (and axiomatically justified) as those 
in the analysis of inequality and poverty. Moreover, the connections between the numerous 
mobility measurement methods advanced in the literature are unclear. At this stage, 
therefore, we must conclude that, although much progress has been made in clarifying the 
meaning and measurement of income mobility especially in the last two decades, much more 
remains to be done in future research. 
Notes 
1. The authors wish to thank Jacques Silber for his patience and encouragement, and Roland Benabou, 
Francois Bourguignon, Valentino Dardanoni, James Foster, Stephen Jenkins, Tapan Mitra, Anthony 
Shorrocks and Ed Wolff for illuminating discussions. The financial support of the Bronfenbrenner Life 
Course Center at Cornell University and the C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics at New York 
University are also gratefully acknowledged. 
2. There are a number of well-known surveys of this literature; see, for instance, Sen (1973), Eichhom and 
Gehrig (1982), Foster (1985) and Lambert (1993). 
3. For example, Karcher, Moyes and Trannoy (1995) note that "... since the individuals' positions on the 
cardinal income scale rarely remain unchanged over time, an increase in a snapshot measure of inequality 
is clearly consistent with there having been a significant amount of equalizing mobility over time. Only 
if all individuals' earnings remain constant from period to period will a measure of inequality or welfare 
give the same result irrespective of the length of the accounting period." This argument is, in fact, at the 
heart of the welfare policy formulations of many economists; see, inter alia, Friedman (1962), and Becker 
and Tomes (1979, 1986). 
4. Throughout this paper, we take "income" as the measure of economic status of interest and "individuals" 
as the interesting unit of observation. Of course, our discussion apply equally to any real-valued measure 
of socioeconomic position (e.g., earnings, indices of occupational status, etc.) among any well-defined 
recipient unit (e.g., households, workers, generations, adult equivalents, etc.). 
5. Among the important omissions are the relation between income mobility and the time period of analyses 
(cf. Shorrocks, 1978a, Creedy, 1985, pp. 97-118, and Creedy, 1992, and references cited therein), and 
econometric mobility measurement techniques like Galtonian regression towards the mean (cf. Creedy, 
1985, Chapter 4, Abowd and Card, 1989, Goldberger, 1989, Zimmerman, 1992, and Atkinson, 
Bourguignon and Morrison, 1992, pp. 8-14, Moffittand Gottschalk, 1995, and Maasoumi, 1996, inter alia). 
6. See, for instance, Shorrocks (1978a), Maasoumi and Zandvakili (1986), Chakravarty, Dutta and Weymark 
(1985) and Creedy (1992). Space limitations preclude giving these contributions the attention they deserve. 
7. More generally, a correlation-based mobility measure can be defined as f(x,y) * H(r(ty(x), i|r(y))) where 
H: [-1,1] ~R and if.R^-R are any continuous functions which are decreasing and increasing, 
respectively. (Convention: <|r(i) = (I|F (xJ),..., + C*.)) and similarly for <Ky).) An example of a 
correlation-based mobility measure is Hart's index, fB(x,y) • 1 -r(log.x, logy), an extensive discussion 
of which can be found in Shorrocks (1993). 
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8. One should not infer from this discussion that movements in the aggregate and origin independence are 
the only aspects of the "income mobility" concept. One might indeed choose to distinguish between 
mobility concepts on the basis of aggregate rerankxngs or intertemporal income inequality (see subsections 
4.1 and 4.2). 
9. One should, however, be careful in relating the notion of aggregate movements to that of intertemporal 
equality, for the correspondence is by no means perfect. Indeed, while the transformation (1,3) - (30,1) 
involves far more movement than process II, there is a clear sense in which this transformation is 
intertemporally disequalizing as compared with process II. Nevertheless, one might justifiably argue that 
such examples are unlikely to be encountered in practice, and hence, the movement aspect of income 
mobility might still be regarded as a telling proxy for intertemporal income equality. 
10. Attaching a precise normative significance to "income mobility" is difficult because of the multi-
dimensionality of this concept (see, however, section 4). Indeed, as stated by Jarvis and Jenkins (1996, 
p. 1), "on the one hand mobility is an indicator of how open society is and the degree of equality of 
opportunity, and hence a Good Thing. To some, greater inequality may be more tolerable if accompanied 
by significant mobility. On the other hand, mobility may also be a synonym for income fluctuations and 
hence economic insecurity, a Bad Thing. Whether income flux is more concentrated amongst the poorest 
or the richest is likely to influence the overall social verdict." 
11. Examples of mobility (or immobility) measures are numerous: the correlation coefficient (McCall, 1973), 
the rank correlation (Schiller, 1977), the quantile (decile) immobility ratio (i.e., the fraction of people 
changing no more than one income quantile (decile); Lillard and Willis, 1978, and Gottschalk, 1982), 
income immobility ratio (i.e., the fraction of people changing no more than one relative income range; 
Thatcher, 1971), Hart's index (Hart, 1981), average jump in income rank (Scon and Litchfield, 1994), 
Shorrocks' index and the Maasoumi-Zandvakili index (Shorrocks, 1978a, 1993, and Maasoumi and 
Zandvakili, 1986). 
12. See, for instance, Chakravarty's contribution in this volume. 
13. Even in the case of income inequality, however, there are persuasive arguments that can be made for 
absolute inequality measures; see Kolm, 1976, and Blackorby and Donaldson, 1980, inter alia. 
14. Whether one's perception of mobility is relative or absolute, is, in the final analysis, a subjective issue. 
In either case, however, it should be noted that one can utilize absolute and relative measures in a 
complementary way. Indeed, in discussions concerning income growth, for instance, it is standard to make 
use of the concepts of per capita growth (which is an absolute notion) and percentage growth (which is 
relative) in a complementary fashion. 
15. Unlike inequality measures, mobility measures can be both absolute and relative. 
16. One argument that may be made against compromise mobility measures is that they may report the same 
level of mobility in the processes (1,100) - (1,101) and (1,100) - (2,100). Indeed, assuming that money 
is valued by a common strictly concave utility function, one might want to argue that the former process 
is less mobile than the latter in the sense that there is less welfare movement in the former transformation 
relative to the latter one (see subsection 4.4). We would like to stress, however, that this is not an 
argument favoring "relativity" over "compromization". Indeed, while the mobility measure (on J?,, 
gfey) sf(.xJ)l^".i^i is relative for any compromise / , it ranks the above processes in exactly the same 
way with / . Moreover, the first process would be declared less mobile by all mobility measures 
(compromise or relative) which satisfy a very weak decomposability property (Axiom WD in subsection 
3.1), provided that these measures are applied to personal percentage changes of income. (That is, given 
such an / , the relative mobility measure / j , defined (on J?., as /8(*,y)=/(l;l,y/jt), where 1„ is then-
dimensional vector of Is and ylxs(yjxl,...,yjxll), would have the property that 
/Ji((l,100),(l,101))</Jt((l,100), (2,100))). 
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17. Furthermore, these decompositions depend crucially on the chosen social welfare function and some strong 
assumptions about the stochastic process that is assumed to generate the mobility of the society. We shall 
have more to say on these issues in sections 4 and 5. 
18. Since each class is assumed to have exactly the same number of members, the transition matrix 
P(x,y) eJif™1 is bistochastic; that is, ^.iP„(x,y) = ^™.iP„&,y) = 1 • However, it must be noted that the 
bistochasticity of the transition matrix "does not imply that the distribution is unchanging over time, and 
that analyses based on quantile transition matrices may confound exchange and structural mobility." 
(Atkinson et al., 1992, p. 15). 
19. Dagum (1980), Shorrocks (1982), Ebert (1984) and Chakravarty and Dutta (1987) have used distance 
functions in the context of inequality measurement. (For an empirical application of such "economic" 
distance functions, see Silber and Berrebi, 1988). In the context of mobility measurement, Cowell (1985) 
appears to be the only study where a distance function theoretic approach is pursued. Cowell's 
development, however, builds upon the concept of a directed distance function, and this distinguishes his 
work from the standard "economic" distance function approach. 
20. That is, we assume that dn(x,y) =d„Cc + a l l | ,y + ol l l) and Xdn(x,y) = dt(Xx,Xy) for all X>0 and a such 
that .r + al^y-nxl^ eR", where 1^  = (l,...,l)eJ?V We note that the analogues of these assumptions are 
routinely used in the literature in income inequality measurement; see, for instance, Blackorby and 
Donaldson (1978, 1980), Ebert (1984, 1988), and Chakravarty and Dutta (1987). 
21. See Fields and Ok (1996) for a detailed discussion of the axioms WD and PC, and a related characterization 
theorem. 
22. Note that the metric axioms are not used in this characterization theorem, while they were necessary in Fact 
1. This is an appealing feature of Fact 2, since it is not apparent why an economic distance function 
should, in fact, satisfy the triangle inequality as an axiom. 
23. Notice that pn is a relative mobility measure, and hence, might appeal to relative mobility adherents. As 
noted earlier, in our opinion dn and p„ should be used in a way to complement each other. For example, 
in the comparison of the transformations IV: (1,3) - (2,6) and V: (2,6)-(4,12), a\ (and, of course, m%) 
report that V is more mobile than IV since it exhibits a higher level of (per capita) income growth than IV, 
while P2 notes that the mobilities of these transformations are (percentage-wise) equal since they both have 
the same percentage income growth. 
24. A "winner" here is defined as an agent whose income increases, and a "loser" as a person whose income 
decreases. 
25. This is, in effect, analogous to using the head count and the poverty gap measures together to get a more 
complete picture of the extent of poverty (this being one of the basic messages of the seminal work of Sen, 
1976). Recall that the head count ratio is insensitive to income movements within the poor class while 
being discontinuous at the poverty line. One the other hand, the poverty gap index is a continuous measure 
which is not particularly sensitive to income variations that carry individuals above the poverty line. Both 
of these measures target a different aspect of the general notion of "economic poverty". 
26. See, among others, Atkinson (1981), Markandya (1982, 1984), King (1983), Chakravarty (1984), 
Chakravarty, Dutta and Weymark (1985), Kanbur and Stiglitz (1986), Slesnick (1986), Kanbur and 
Stromberg (1988), Atkinson, Bourguignon and Morrison (1992), Dardanoni (1991, 1993, 1995) and 
Gottschalk and Spolaore (1998). 
27. Friedman (1962), for instance, takes this argument to the extreme and suggests the substitution of income 
mobility for income equality as a normative justification of competitive free enterprise capitalism. His 
classic quotation reads as follows: "Consider two societies that have the same distribution of annual income. 
In one there is great mobility and change so that the position of particular families in the income hierarchy 
varies widely from year to year. In the other, there is great rigidity so that each family stays in the same 
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position year after year. The one kind of inequality is a sign of dynamic change, social mobility, equality 
of opportunity; the other, of a status society. The confusion of these two kinds of inequality is particularly 
important precisely because competitive free-enterprise capitalism tends to substitute the one for the 
other...capitalism undermines status and induces social mobility" (Friedman (1962), p. 171). Of course, 
this proposition is hardly self-evident. (Solon, 1992, and Zimmerman, 1992, for instance, provide 
convincing evidence to the effect that there is a rather high (in the order of 0.4) intergenerational correlation 
in long-run income in the United States. Similar results are reported for Britain as well by Atkinson, 
1981b.) Moreover, the nature of the relation between the inequality of snapshot (or lifetime) incomes and 
income mobility is by no means clear either empirically or theoretically. (Indeed, some empirical studies 
have found only a weak relationship between income mobility and inequality through time; see Kearl and 
Pope, 1984.) For an illuminating account of this issue, we refer the reader to Atkinson, Bourguignon and 
Morrison (1992), pp. 23-29, and references cited therein. See also Shorrocks (1978a), Kanbur and Stiglitz 
(1986), Kanbur and Stromberg (1988), Conlisk (1989), Basmann, Hayes and Slottje (1991), and Dardanoni 
(1991, 1995) for related measurement-theoretic examinations. 
28. The arbitrariness of the choice of the social welfare function may, in fact, be thought of as the major 
shortcoming of the welfarist approach (see, however, subsection 4.3). Moreover, by definition of social 
welfare functions, this approach brings with it all the well-known difficulties associated with the concept 
of "welfarism" (see Sen, 1979). 
29. The following subsections are only meant to provide the reader with some examples of welfarist income 
mobility measurement techniques, and are by no means comprehensive. See, in particular, the important 
works of Shorrocks (1978a), Maasoumi and Zandvakili (1986, 1990) and Markandya (1982a). 
30. By convention, we shall define a generic SWF on feasible incomes, rather than on utility profiles, in what 
follows. 
31. The basic premise of this approach is analogous to the pioneering work of Kolm (1969) and Atkinson 
(1970) on income inequality measurement. See also Markandya (1982a) for a similar approach. 
32. Chakravarty et al. (1985) provides a useful characterization of MCDW which amounts to determining 
necessary and sufficient conditions on the functional structure of a mobility index such that there exists a 
well-behaved W: R" -JJ which would induce the index via the procedure described above. The approach 
parallels the work of Blackorby and Donaldson (1978), the focus of which was the welfarist measurement 
of relative income inequality along the lines outlined in Kolm (1969), Atkinson (1970) and Sen (1973). For 
more on this, see the contribution of Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson in this volume. 
33. While it is not readily clear when a transformation can actually be obtained from another by a finite 
sequence of diagonalizing switches, Atkinson (1981) and Atkinson et al. (1992) give a characterization of 
• , which overcomes this difficulty: 
(x~y)>A(z-w) if and only if PCUM{x,y) iPCUM(.z,w) 
where Pcmf(x,y) = [£J_, T.%iPij(x,y)] eR?°" and PclM(z,w) is defined similarly. 
34. See Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) for various extensions of this result. 
35. An analogous idea was developed by Watts (1968) in the context of poverty measurement where it was 
suggested that one should represent the deprivation of a poor individual in terms of the utility shortfall from 
the level of utility that would have been enjoyed with an income precisely at the poverty line; see also 
Zheng (1993), and Foster and Jin (1994). 
36. Formally speaking, a mobility measure / is said to be subgroup decomposable, if, for any 
x
J
,yJeR"{,j =l,...,J, such that E ^ n ^ - n , 
J 
fn((x\...,xJ\(y\...,yJ))=Y. fn^.y')-
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37. Since ft and /„ are the only absolute and relative measures in Q , we should note that the subclass 
U 
Q0 = [fn : 0 < a < 1} may be viewed as a one-parameter class of "intermediate" measures of income 
mobility. 
38. Some studies are actually conducted in terms of continuous time Markov chains; see, for instance, Coleman 
(1964), Bartholomew (1982), Geweke, Marshall and Zarkin (1986) and Kanbur and Stromberg (1988). 
39. Among the examples of mobility measures of this form are the trace (Prais, 1995 and Bibby, 1975), and 
the second largest eigenvalue modulus (Theil, 1972, Shorrocks, 1978, and Sommers and Conlisk, 1979). 
Provided that the transition matrices under consideration are regular (i.e., P*eR™ for large enough k), 
one can define more sophisticated mobility measures like the mean first passage time (Conlisk, 1985,1990) 
and weighted trace (Bartholomew, 1982). For formal examinations of these measures and further examples 
we refer the reader to Bibby (1975), Bartholomew (1982) and Conlisk (1990). 
40. Having said this, however, we should note that Shorrocks (1978, pp. 1016-7) argues that "... as more 
movement is observed it would be normal to expect the class occupied in the future to become less 
dependent on the present position. In general, therefore, they should be in harmony. This leads us to ask 
whether too much emphasis has been placed on examples of transition matrices which, by any stretch of 
imagination, are unlikely to arise in practice." One can indeed establish the compatibility of all the 
properties outlined above by restricting the domain of mobility matrices. For instance, it is possible to 
devise mobility indices which satisfy all of Shorrocks' axioms on the subdomain of mobility matrices with 
maximal (or, more generally, quasi-maximal) diagonals (Shorrocks, 1978 and Bhattacharya, 1994). 
Nevertheless, the usefulness of such restrictions is suspect with regard to both theoretical and empirical 
perspectives (cf. Conlisk, 1990). 
41. Denoting the proportion of the individuals with income level JC, in the (P- induced) expected income 
distribution of period r - 1 by xfi -1) we must have n(f) = it(r-l)F (where 
n(f - 1) = (*,(* - l),...,itmit - 1))) for all t k 1. 
42. See Kanbur and Stiglitz (1986) and Kanbur and Stromberg (1988). 
43. The proof of this claim is simple and is illustrative of the structure brought in by monotone mobility 
matrices. Observe first that P is monotone iff T'1 PTrz 0 where T= [f^ ] £R"°* with r# = 1 if i ij, and 
fs - 0 otherwise. Notice also that "expected" income distribution TC (f - 1) is more equal than (stochastically 
dominates) the distribution TC"(I-1) iff i t ( t - 1)7" £ it*(f- 1)7" and P stochastically dominates Q iff 
PTiQT. But then, given that P is monotomc, if J E ( J - 1 ) is more equal than jc*(r-l), and P 
stochastically dominates Q, 
(7i (» - 1)P) T- (7t*(f - 1)<?) T= (TC (r - 1) - it*(r-l)) T(T-lPT) + 7t'(r - 1) (P - (?) Ts 0 
that is, Jt(f - X)P is more equal than %'(t - 1)Q. The converse of the statement is basically trivial. 
44. Since >D can only rank transition matrices with identical steady-state income distributions, it is, in fact, 
an exchange mobility ordering. Moreover, one can show that it approaches 'income mobility' from the 
angle of temporal independence (or equality of opportunity). See Dardanoni (1993) for an extensive 
discussion of these issues. 
45. >D is nevertheless a parametric ordering due to its dependence on the discount factor. The problem of 
determining the (most general) conditions under which Dardanoni's ordering would rank all monotone and 
regular transition matrices (with the same equilibrium) for all discount factors, is at the moment open (but 
see Dardanoni, 1993, Theorem 3, for a partial answer to this question). This problem is in the same spirit 
as the problem of obtaining a parameter-free characterization of the Mitra-Ok ordering discussed in 
subsection 3.4. 
46. Actually, if the chains under consideration are fractile; i.e., the probability of being in any state at any time 
is always 1/m then the equal steady-state assumption is automatically met. In this respect, Dardanoni's 
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ordering is of considerable use in analyzing interfractile mobility. Moreover, Formby, Smith and Zheng 
(1995) have shown that Dardanoni's joint-steady state requirement can be relaxed to obtain a mobility 
ordering that can compare mobility processes that start from any given (not necessarily steady state) 
distribution JC. Recently, a dual approach is developed by Benabou and Ok (1999) who compare the 
distributions of expected future incomes (or their present values) under different mobility processes by 
fixing the income levels xl J:,, and varying the distribution 7t. One advantage of this dual approach is 
to allow one to view a mobility process as a redistribution policy, and this, in rum, leads to the idea of 
using tax progressivity indices to assess the extent of mobility as an equalizer of ex ante opportunities. 
47. If these assumptions are made, one can standardize the observation period pertaining to the transition 
matrices. For instance, if P refers to a unit period and Q to k*2 many unit periods, by means of (1) 
and (2), we may adjust P as Pl to refer to jfc periods. But, as demonstrated by Shorrocks (1978), this 
adjustment is quite problematic. (For instance, what guarantees that the comparison between P* and Q, 
and between P as Q ' will yield the same conclusions?) 
48. As noted by Dardanoni (1995), however, one may be able to reduce a higher-order Markov chain to a first 
order one by suitably redefining the boundaries of the income states (cf. Billingsley, 1961). 
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